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Auditor Independence and the Cost of Capital Before and After Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Case of Newly Issued Public Debt 
Abstract 
An important aim of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was to reduce cost of capital by enhancing 
auditor independence. However, prior literature has argued that SOX has been ineffective in 
meeting this objective. We contribute to this debate by first providing evidence suggesting that 
auditor independence has increased following SOX. Though we posit an inverse relationship 
between auditor independence and cost of capital, it is an open question whether this relationship 
has become stronger or weaker following SOX. An examination of this relationship reveals that 
auditor independence is more strongly related to bond rating and bond yield premium in the post-
SOX period relative to the period before SOX. This evidence supports the argument that SOX has 
created benefits that resulted in lower cost of borrowing. 
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Auditor Independence and the Cost of Capital Before and After Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Case of Newly Issued Public Debt 
 
1. Introduction 
Better quality of financial information attracts higher valuations because investors can 
measure future cash flows with greater degree of certainty. This implies that the cost of capital is 
inversely related to the degree of reliability in reported financial figures (Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 
2001; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Nikolaev and Van Lent, 2005). 
Because auditors can influence managers' reporting practices, the literature also suggests that 
auditor independence and reliability of financial reporting are positively related (Kinney et al., 
2004). Independent auditors can also provide effective monitoring to deter fraud and wasteful 
actions at the expense of lenders and shareholders (DeAngelo, 1981). As a result, firms audited 
by more independent auditors are expected to benefit from lower cost capital. The scant research 
on the association between auditor independence and the cost of capital confirms this hypothesis 
(Khurana and Raman, 2006; Brandon et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2009) 
The accounting scandals in the early 2000s prompted U.S. legislators to pass the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Among other objectives, the aim of the act was to enhance auditor 
independence as a means to reducing cost of capital. The SEC (2003) has maintained that 
potential benefits include increased investor confidence in the independence of accountants, in 
the audit process, and in the reliability of reported financial information, which would result in a 
lower cost of capital.1 But little is empirically known if SOX has been successful in meeting this 
objective. To shed light on this question, we examine if the inverse relationship between auditor 
independence and cost of capital has become stronger or weaker following SOX. Evidence that 
auditor independence is higher coupled with stronger inverse relationship between cost of 
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capital and auditor independence would support the argument that SOX has been successful in 
meeting its stated objective, namely, a unit of auditor independence is priced in capital markets 
more after SOX than before.  
We develop a model in which an auditor optimally decides on the level of independence.  
This decision is influenced by the level of fees she can charge for reducing her independence 
against litigation and reputation costs, that arise when quality of reported numbers is poorer or 
monitoring and fraud detection are less effective. Investors in turn price the client’s securities 
taking into account the quality of information and the strength of monitoring by auditors. 
Consistent with prior literature, better disclosure and monitoring lead to higher valuation 
because they involve higher cash flows and less information asymmetry. In this model, cost of 
capital is therefore inversely related to auditor independence. The various requirements of SOX 
(see below) affect the level of independence chosen by the auditor by changing the cost-benefit 
analysis she faces. This, in turn, may enhance or weaken the positive relationships between 
independence on one hand and monitoring and quality of disclosure on the other hand, 
depending on the assumed functional relationships. As a result, the magnitude of the negative 
relationship between auditor independence and cost of capital may be stronger or weaker 
following SOX. Hence, this is ultimately an empirical issue. However, we show that under 
certain conditions an increase in auditor independence following SOX is expected to increase the 
magnitude of this relationship.  
There are a number of reasons why SOX is expected to enhance auditor independence. 
First, SOX may have forced firms and external auditors to implement mechanisms that are 
capable of reducing misreporting. Second, by barring auditors from providing certain non-audit 
services (NAS), SOX may have forced auditors to direct more effort to the audit task and to 
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better monitoring of potentially fraudulent activities. Prior to this change, audit services may 
have been provided at a loss, reducing their effectiveness. Furthermore, the establishment of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a quasi-governmental agency, has 
fundamentally changed the regulation of the audit profession, which previously was self-
regulated (DeFond and Francis, 2005). As a result, auditors face tougher scrutiny and tighter 
enforcement following SOX. Third, SOX makes it unlawful to exert improper influence on 
external auditors. Collectively, these requirements imply that the costs associated with weak 
independence should increase following SOX, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, the level of 
auditor independence should increase after SOX. However, a number of commentators have 
argued that it is unclear whether SOX has been effective in changing auditors’ incentives and the 
way they operate (e.g., Ribstein, 2002; DeFond and Francis, 2005).  
We use the primary bond market in our empirical assessment of the effect of SOX on the 
cost of capital. We use bond ratings and yield premium as measures of cost of debt capital. We 
use the bond market because the pricing of debt is better defined and easily measured than that 
of equity (Mansi et al., 2004). This allows sharper inferences because there is no need to rely on 
inherently noisy models for estimating the cost of equity capital. Also, accounting research tends 
to focus on valuation effects on equity, however, as debt markets are larger than equity markets, 
it is important to consider the effects of auditor independence on the pricing of debt. 
Our sample contains public firms that actively and often repeatedly issue debt and for 
which any changes in ratings and the cost of debt are expected to have material impact on cash 
flows. Since secondary markets are less liquid, using the primary bond market avoids 
measurement issues due to stale prices or ratings. Furthermore, within this sample we also 
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identify a subset of companies that issued bonds both before and after SOX. As such, reported 
findings are less sensitive to variation in firm-specific effects. 
An economic dependence between external auditors and their clients may arise when an 
auditor relies on fees for non-audit services (NAS) or when an individual client generates an 
unusually high proportion of the auditor’s total fee income. By offering a more profitable line of 
business, auditors may sacrifice independence in the audit task and risk litigation in order to 
maintain the more lucrative engagements (Levitt, 2000; Pany and Reckers, 1983; DeFond et al., 
2002). Thus, consistent with prior studies, our first measure of auditor independence is based on 
the ratio of audit fees to total (i.e., audit fees plus non-audit) fees. The second measure is the log 
of total fees paid to the auditor, which unlike the first measure, is sensitive to scaling effects and 
may provide a better reflection of the importance of a client to the auditor’s business (Ashbaugh 
et al., 2003; DeFond and Francis, 2005). We regress these two measures on firm-specific, 
auditor-specific and task-complexity factors, consistent with models used by Kinney and Libby 
(2002), Frankel et al., (2002), and Ruddock et al., (2006). Then, we estimate auditor 
independence as the unexpected ratio of audit fees to total fees and the unexpected component of 
total fees, respectively. 
We first document evidence consistent with a positive effect of SOX on auditor 
independence. We then find stronger positive association between auditor independence and 
bond ratings for bonds issued in the post-SOX period than for bonds issued before SOX was 
enacted. We also find stronger negative association between auditor independence and yield 
spreads in the post-SOX period. These findings are robust to additional sensitivity analyses, such 
as controlling for multiple issues by the same firms and examining a sample of firms that issue 
debt both in the pre- and post-SOX periods. Collectively, these findings support the view that 
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SOX enhanced auditor independence and, as a result, lowered cost of debt capital. The finding 
that auditor independence is more strongly related to cost of debt capital after SOX than before 
is consistent with auditor independence becoming more credible for monitoring and reporting 
purposes after SOX. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background 
necessary to establish the main research question. Section 3 discusses the research design while 
the sample and data are described in Section 4. The results of the empirical analyses are reported 
in Section 5. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
Auditor independence affects cost of capital in two ways. First, greater independence leads 
to better monitoring of the firm’s net assets by the external auditors and higher rates of fraud 
discovery (DeAngelo, 1981). Better monitoring by auditors allows investors to forgo their own 
costly monitoring activities aimed at reducing the risk of expropriation on part of managers. 
This reduces the cost of capital and increases the price investors are willing to pay for the firm’s 
securities. Consistent with this argument, Ashbaugh and Warfiled (2003) document a positive 
association between the selection of auditors with better monitoring skills and corporate debt 
levels in Germany. Second, independent auditors increase the credibility of reported figures and 
hence reduce the information asymmetry between investors and managers, which in turn reduces 
investment risk and cost of capital. Consistent with this argument, Pitman and Fortin (2004) find 
that large auditors provide better monitoring, which restricts earnings management and increases 
earnings quality. Botosan (1997) finds that the amount of information in financial statements is 
inversely related to measures of cost of equity capital. Hail (2002) finds that in Switzerland, 
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where managers have considerable reporting discretion, measures of voluntary disclosure are 
inversely related to the ex-ante cost of capital. Yu (2005) extends Botosan's (1997) findings to 
debt markets. 
We present a model (see Appendix) where the level of auditor independence is determined 
by profit-maximizing auditors who trade off additional fees (for instance in the form of NAS) 
for lower independence, with likely litigation cost and loss of reputation (Palmrose, 1988). It is 
assumed that greater independence improves reporting quality, monitoring and fraud detection. 
Consequently, the resulting relationship between auditor independence and cost of capital is 
negative; however, the magnitude of this relationship varies with the level of independence (i.e., 
non-linear relationship). We show that SOX may increase or decrease this magnitude, depending 
on certain parameter values. We define certain conditions under which this magnitude increases 
with auditor independence. Specifically, this will be the case if the precision of financial 
reporting is sufficiently sensitive to changes in auditor independence. If SOX resulted in an 
increase in the optimal level of auditor independence, we expect a stronger negative relationship 
between cost of capital and auditor independence after SOX. 
We later provide evidence consistent with SOX increasing auditor independence. In 
addition, Cohen et al. (2008) provide evidence that reporting quality increased after SOX (as 
measured by a decline in earnings management). Taken together, these empirical findings 
suggest a calibration of our model under which financial reporting is quite sensitive to changes 
in auditor independence and, hence, a stronger negative association between auditor 
independence and cost of debt capital following SOX. However, as we discuss below, these 
latter observations aside, the literature on SOX is yet undecided on its likely effects.  
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SOX was enacted in order to fix auditing, particularly auditor independence, in the U.S. 
(Coates, 2007). To enhance auditor independence SOX requires a variety of mechanisms that 
directly aim at enhancing external monitoring activities through improving internal control 
procedures and placing more responsibility on the internal audit committee. The Act has also 
introduced greater costs for audit failures through the establishment of the PCAOB, whose role 
is “to protect investors and the public interest by promoting informative, fair, and independent 
audit reports".2 In addition, new regulations bar certain non-audit services (NAS) and require fee 
disclosures. The regulators’ presumption is that the removal of NAS, the disclosure requirements 
and the overall strengthening of the external auditor’s position should result in greater auditor 
independence.3 
Still, some argue (e.g., Ribstein, 2002; DeFond and Francis, 2005) that SOX is too costly 
and potentially ineffective. It is also possible that fees lost because of restrictions on NAS were 
recovered by charging higher audit fees, as auditors passed on to clients any cost they have 
incurred after SOX. Moreover, Coates (2007) argues that SOX made relatively small changes to 
already existing rules governing NAS. In addition, it has been argued that SOX may have 
resulted in a better alignment of shareholders’ interests with that of managers, which can come 
at the expense of lenders (DeFond et al., 2007). The benefit of improved independence, if any, 
may thus accrue to shareholders and lenders will not be able to reduce cost of capital.     
Given these conflicting arguments, we therefore ask: Has the passage of SOX enhanced 
auditor independence and has it affected the association between auditor independence and the 
cost of debt capital? To the extent that SOX has enhanced auditor independence, this should lead 
to more effective monitoring activities and the supply of higher quality information. If lenders 
have benefitted from better auditor independence, we would expect to see stronger relationship 
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between auditor independence and cost of capital following SOX. 
 
3. Research Design 
The sample period is 2000-2006. To be classified as Pre (Post) – SOX observation, a new 
bond issue must take place before (after) 30 July 2002, the date SOX was signed into law. Each 
bond issue is matched with the most recently available annual report. We assume that annual 
reports become available within three months from fiscal year-end. For example, a bond issued 
on 15 April 2002 for a company with 31 December fiscal year-end is matched with the annual 
report data provided by Compustat for the year ended 31 December 2001 (Compustat item FYR 
= 2001).  
Auditor independence is measured in two ways. The first is the ratio of audit fees to total 
fees (RAUD). A higher RAUD implies lower economic bond, because the proportion of NAS 
services is lower. However, audit and non-audit fees paid by an individual client may be 
affected by a variety of firm characteristics, auditor-specific factors and, in our sample period, 
by time trend due to structural changes in the audit market after SOX. For example, firms 
characterized by high business risk or complex mergers and acquisition activity are likely to 
experience higher audit fees. For such firms RAUD may incorrectly indicate lower economic 
bond. Kinney and Libby (2002) argue that independence should be measured with respect to the 
component of fees that is unexplained by these factors. Accordingly, we construct a model that 
explains the level of RAUD and use regression residuals to construct a measure of unexpected 
RAUD, denoted as UNEXPRAUD, where higher UNEXPRAUD signifies more independence. 
The second measure is based on the unexpected element in log of total fees (UNEXPLTFEE) for 
similar reasons. Log of total fees (LTFEE), in contrast to RAUD, is sensitive to scaling effects, 
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and may provide a better reflection of the importance of a client to the auditor’s business 
(Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Francis, 2006). Note that higher UNEXPLTFEE signifies less 
independence. 
To measure the unexpected components of RAUD and LTFEE, we use a model similar to 
the one in Frankel et al. (2002) and Ruddock et al. (2006). Specifically, fees paid to the auditor 
are a function of a number of firm-specific factors (e.g., financial performance, leverage, 
market-to-book and growth), auditor-specific factors (e.g., Big-4 indicator, tenure and whether 
the auditor has been recently replaced), as well as task-complexity factors (e.g., size, and 
number of business segments). We also include a proxy for litigation risk, which may affect 
fees. Specifically, the full model, estimated on an annual basis is: 
 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15
ij i i i i i
i i i i i i
j ij ij i i
DEPEND ROA LOSS MRET CFO LEV
INVREC SIZE MB SALESG MA SEG
AUDDUM TENU SWITCH LIT
α β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β β ν
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + +
           (1) 
 
Where: DEPENDij = {RAUDij, LTFEEij} is a measure of the economic dependence between a 
client i and an audit firm j. Independent variables that capture client performance and general 
audit risk are defined as follows: ROAi denotes return on assets, measured as net income divided 
by total assets; LOSSi is an indicator variable equals to "1" if the firm reported a net loss in the 
current fiscal year, and "0" otherwise; MRETi is market adjusted annual stock return (measured 
over the last 12 months of the reporting period); CFOi denotes cash flows from operations 
divided by total assets; LEVi denotes leverage ratio, measured as long-term debt divided by total 
assets. The proxies for task complexity are: INVRECi is equal to inventory plus accounts 
receivable divided by total assets; SIZEi denotes firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of 
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one plus total assets; MBi is the market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity; SALESGi is sales growth, measured as average percentage 
change in sales over the last three years; MAi is an indicator variable equals to "1" if the firm is 
involved in merger and acquisition activities in the current year, and "0"; SEGi is the number of 
the firm's business segments. Variables that capture auditor characteristics include: AUDDUMj 
is an indicator variable equals to "1" if the auditor is a Big-4 firm, and "0" otherwise. This 
variable captures the perceived quality of the auditor. TENUij is the natural logarithm of [one 
plus the number of years the firm has been consistently audited by the current auditor, as of the 
bond issuance date and based on Compustat]. This variable is a proxy for degree of familiarity 
with the auditee. SWITCH is an indicator variable, equal to “1” if a bond-issuing firm switches 
to a different audit firm in the fiscal year prior to the bond issuance, and “0” otherwise. It is 
included because firms may engage in opinion shopping which may lead to an effect on fees 
paid to the new auditor (Lennox, 2000). Finally, LITi is a proxy for litigation risk, measured as 
the standard deviation of monthly stock return for the past 36 months (Francis et al., 1994). 
We estimate Equation (1) for each year with industry fixed effects according to Fama and 
French's 12-industry classification. Then, we compute the unexpected components of RAUD and 
LTFEE as the regression residual. Positive (negative) UNEXPRAUD indicates greater (lower) 
independence. To simplify the reading of our results, we reverse the sign of residual form the 
LTFEE regression, so as to obtain a similar ordering whereby a positive residual indicates high 
level of independence while a negative residual signifies low level of independence.  
Consistent with Ziebart and Reiter (1992) and Shi (2003), we use bond rating assigned by 
credit rating agencies and bond yield spread to capture the cost of borrowing. We construct one 
equation where bond rating (RATING) is the dependent variable and a second equation where 
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bond yield spread (SPREAD) is the dependent variable. Though we are particularly interested in 
the association between auditor independence, the main variable of interest, and bond ratings 
and yield spread, we control for a number of factors that prior studies (e.g., Ziebart and Reiter, 
1992; and Mansi et al., 2004) have identified to be associated with the cost of borrowing. 
Specifically, the basic bond rating equations contain the following components: 
 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
i ij i i i i
i i i i
RATING INDEP ISIZE SIZE LEV OSCORE
COVR ROA LIT
α β β β β β
β β β ν
= + + + + +
+ + + +              (2a) 
 
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
i ij i i i i
i i i i i
SPREAD INDEP RATING ISIZE SIZE LEV
OSCORE COVR ROA LIT
α β β β β β
β β β β ν
= + + + + +
+ + + + +             (2b) 
 
Bond ratings are coded as integers ranging from 1 (Aaa) to 22 (D) based on Moody’s 
categorical bond rating (higher integer value implies worse rating). Yield spread is defined as 
the difference in percentage points between the yield to maturity for the corporate debt and the 
yield on a United States treasury bond with comparable maturity on the issuance date. Higher 
spread thus implies higher cost of debt capital. That is, yield spread is unaffected by the level of 
the risk-free rate.  
The coefficient β1 on INDEPit captures the effect of auditor independence on bond ratings 
and yield spread. Consistent with the theoretical model, greater independence leads to lower cost 
of capital, implying that the coefficients β1 in equations (2a) and (2b) are expected to be 
negative. We use the following control variables in our regression models: ISIZEi denotes the 
relative size of the debt issue, measured as the total principal amount of debt issue divided by 
the firm's total assets. Large debt issue means higher probability of default and therefore is 
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expected to be positively related to the cost of borrowing (Sengupta, 1998). SIZEi is firm size, as 
defined before. Ceteris paribus, larger firms are more diversified and less risky, hence are 
expected to have better bond ratings and lower bond yield premium. LEVi is a leverage ratio as 
defined above. Higher leverage ratios are associated with lower ratings (higher assigned 
integers) and higher bond yield premium, because leverage is associated with financial risk. 
OSCOREi is a measure of bankruptcy risk, measured as Ohlson's (1980) score. This score 
captures likelihood of bankruptcy that may not be captured by other variables and is expected to 
be negatively related to bond rating and the cost of borrowing. COVRi is the firm's interest 
coverage ratio, measured as operating income divided by interest expenses. This variable 
captures the ability of the borrowing firm to make regular interest payment. We thus expect 
higher coverage ratio to be positively (negatively) related to ratings (bond yield premium). ROAi 
is operating profitability, as defined above. Consistent with Shi (2003), we expect higher 
profitability to be positively (negatively) related to ratings (bond yield spread). Finally, LITi is a 
measure of litigation risk, as defined before. This risk measure is expected to be associated with 
lower rating and higher cost of borrowing. 
The bond yield spread equation also includes bond ratings (RATING) as an explanatory 
variable. Rating agencies (e.g., Moody’s) assess default probabilities, which are used by 
investors, together with other information (e.g., auditor independence) to price bonds. As 
investors likely observe the rating agencies’ reports and use these as inputs into their own 
models in addition to their private information, we use RATING as a proxy for investors’ own 
assessment of default probability. Consequently, the other coefficients in Equation (2b) capture 
any incremental effect on the bond yield spread of investors’ beliefs after controlling for the 
information already reflected in ratings. 
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The focus of the main tests is whether the coefficients β1 in equations (2a) and (2b) 
changed around the enactment of SOX. To facilitate these tests, we define an indicator variable, 
SOX, which is set equal to “1” during the post-SOX period, and “0” otherwise. To the extent that 
SOX has increased auditor independence and consequently resulted in reduction in cost of 
capital, the difference of the coefficient on INDEP is expected to be negative and significant. 
Absence such an effect, or to the extent that bondholders are worse off because of the effect of 
SOX on auditor independence, we would expect a non-negative difference. 
 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
To estimate Equation (1) we employ a dataset based on the intersection of Compustat and 
Audit-Analytics. The Audit-Analytics database provides data for public firms about auditor 
independence characteristics, including the client-level audit/non-audit fees, auditor-level 
audit/non-audit fees, and other variables. This procedure results in 21,773 firm/year 
observations suitable for estimating Equation (1). In this analysis, we use a larger sample than 
the sample of bond issuers that will be used for the main analysis. This is because we are 
interested in measuring auditor independence for the entire population and not only for bond 
issuers to avoid bias in these measures. This procedure also furnishes more power to capture 
structural changes following SOX. The estimation of the RAUD regression employs the quasi-
likelihood method (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) since the dependent variable ranges between 
zero and one. The regression results for RAUD are presented in Table 1, Panel A, whereas the 
regression results for LTFEE are presented in Panel B of this table. 
Analyzing this sample (results not tabulated) shows that mean (median) RAUD increases, 
at the 0.01 level, from 0.43 (0.42) before SOX to 0.66 (0.70) after SOX. Also, mean (median) 
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LTFEE decreases, at the 0.01 level, from 13.58 (13.58) before SOX to 13.24 (13.07) after SOX. 
These findings are consistent with an increase in auditor independence following the enactment 
of SOX. 
Focusing on panel A, several variables exhibit consistent association with RAUD. The 
coefficients on LOSS (negative income indicator) are positive and significant at the 0.10 level or 
better in four of the seven years examined, suggesting that audit fees are higher for loss-making 
firms, consistent with higher audit and reputation risks. Companies with higher cash flows 
consume less audit services relative to total services, as reflected by the negative coefficients on 
CFO (significant at the 0.10 level or better in five of the seven years reported). Firm size (SIZE) 
is negatively (at the 0.05 level or better in all years) related to RAUD, as expected, suggesting 
that larger firms pay relatively more non-audit fees. Firms with higher market-to-book ratios 
tend to pay more for NAS. Companies engaging in M&A activities tend to increase NAS, as 
reflected by the negative coefficients on MA (significant at the 0.05 level or better in five out of 
seven years). Auditor size (AUDDUM) is negatively related to RAUD in 2000-2002, but this 
relation reverses in 2004-2006. This suggests that in more recent years large auditors provide 
relatively more audit than non-audit services. This is explained, at least in part, by the effect of 
SOX and the collapse of Arthur-Andersen. Risk of litigation (LIT) is positively related to RAUD, 
suggesting that auditors spend relatively more effort on the audit task in the presence of 
litigation risk. The remaining variables exhibit sporadic relation with RAUD obtaining 
significant coefficients in certain periods but not in others. Using the results in panel A, we use 
the regression residuals as a measure of unexpected RAUD and denote it UNEXPRAUD. 
Turning to Panel B, all seven coefficients on ROA are negative, as expected, and 
significant at the 0.01 level suggesting that profitable firms’ total fees to auditors are lower. 
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Firms with relatively larger inventories and receivables consume relatively more services, as 
reflected by the positive coefficients on INVREC (significant at the 0.01 level in all years). Also, 
as expected, larger firms consume more services from audit firms, as reflected by the positive 
and significant coefficients on SIZE. Firms characterized by high market-to-book ratios pay 
more to audit firms due to the presence of more intangibles, which may be associated with the 
demand for special services from the audit firm. Engaging in mergers and acquisition activities 
and having more business segments require more services from the audit firms, as indicated by 
the positive coefficients on MA and SEG (generally significant at the 0.05 level or better). 
Larger audit firms are more “expensive” than smaller ones, as suggested by the positive 
coefficients on AUDDUM. Also, since 2002 longer client-auditor relationship are associated 
with larger total fees, as reflected by the positive coefficients on TENU. In contrast, companies 
that switch auditors pay less total fees to the new audit firm, consistent with low balling by new 
auditors. As expected, companies exposed to higher litigation risk pay more to the audit firms 
(coefficients on LIT are positive and significant at the 0.05 level or better in 2002-2006). The 
remaining variables (LOSS, MRET, CFO, and LEV) exhibit weak or sporadic association with 
total fees, perhaps due to the correlation with other explanatory variables. Using the results in 
panel B, we compute the unexpected levels of total fees, reverse its sign, and denote it 
UNEXPLTFEE. 
We also estimated Equation (1) using a pooled fixed-effects model. We find that yearly 
intercepts in the RAUD regression monotonically increase over time (not tabulated). In 
particular, the regression intercept in 2001 is 0.10 larger than that in 2000. Similarly, the 
regression intercepts increase by 0.40, 0.71, 1.16, 1.52 and 1.63 in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
2006, respectively (all at the 0.01 level). This behaviour is consistent with higher auditor 
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independence after SOX. Similarly, we find (results not tabulated) that the yearly intercepts in 
the LTFEE regression are stable in 2000-2003 but there is an upward shift in 2004-2006 
(significant at the 0.01 level). This pattern suggests an increase in total fees to the audit firm 
after SOX, which could be explained by the additional audit tasks imposed by it. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Our main sample is based on firms that issued bonds in the primary market. We use the 
Security Database Corporation (SDC) Platinum database to extract all information about new 
bond issues by US companies from June 1999 to September 2007, including non-convertible 
debt issues, convertible debt issues and mortgage & asset-backed debt issues. Bonds that are not 
rated by Moody’s and those with maturities of one year or less are excluded from the sample. In 
addition, we exclude bonds issued by financial institutions (4-digit SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
public utilities (4-digit SIC codes 4900-4949) due to the different structure of their financial 
statements and regulatory environment. Bond issues that coincide with mergers, acquisitions or 
initial public offerings are removed from the analysis in order to mitigate the effect of 
confounding events. 
The observations included in the final sample meet the following criteria: data on bond 
issuance characteristics are available on SDC; firms’ financial data are available in Compustat; 
data on audit firms’ characteristics, audit/non-audit fees are available on AA. The final sample 
consists of 1,802 bond issuances over seven fiscal years (2000-2006). 4  Table 2, Panel A, 
summarizes the sample selection process. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the industry composition of the final sample based on the 
Fama-French (FF) 12-industry classification. The Table shows that a large number of bonds in 
the sample are issued by companies in the consumer durables industry (FF2), manufacturing 
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(FF3), and chemicals and applied products (FF5), however, the composition of the observations 
exhibits no significant clustering of firms or industries. Furthermore, a large number of firms are 
involved in multiple bond issues (about five issues per firm, on average). We take account of 
this in the various analyses. Also, our empirical tests control for industry fixed effects based on 
this distribution. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. Panel A presents 
summary statistics for each variable in the Pre- and Post-SOX periods. In addition, we present 
results of univariate tests on the difference in means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon test). As 
panel A shows, mean (median) SPREAD increased from 1.55 (1.20) in the Pre-SOX period to 
1.80 (1.60) in the Post-SOX period (significant at the 0.01 level). Similarly, means and median 
bond rating (RATING) increased following the enactment of SOX (significant at the 0.01 level). 
These results suggest that bonds have become more risky following the enactment of SOX. 
Panel A also shows that return on assets (ROA), cash from operations (CFO) and market-to-
book ratios (MB) decreased subsequent to the enactment of SOX. This reduction in firm 
profitability is consistent with the increase in bond risk. 
Audit fees account for 39% of total fees (mean RAUD = 0.39) in the Pre-SOX period, 
increasing to 68% (mean RAUD = 0.68) following SOX (difference is significant at the 0.01 
level), consistent with new restrictions on NAS. Total fees are smaller in the post-SOX period, 
suggesting auditors have not been able to recoup lost NAS fees through higher audit fees. 
Looking at other audit independence variables, we observe an increase in the level of auditor 
independence following the enactment of SOX (significant at the 0.01 level). For instance, the 
mean for UNEXPRAUD decreases from 0.18 to 0.10 (significant at the 0.01 level) implying that 
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the level of independence has increased. Also, the mean of UNEXPLTFEE decreased from -0.04 
in the Pre-SOX period to -0.19 in the post-SOX period (significant at the 0.01 level). Note that 
this variable is negative owing to the multiplication of the regression residual by -1. 
Panel B shows a significant increase in RAUD from 2002 onward, indicating that 
restrictions on the provision of NAS have been quite effective and auditors have become more 
independent after SOX. In particular, whereas only 33% of total fees were paid in 2000-2001 for 
audit services, by 2005 this figure has increased to 78%. This indicates a structural shift in the 
market for services provided by external auditors following SOX. The Panel also shows a 
decline in log of total fees (LTFEE), consistent with an increase in overall auditor independence.  
(Table 3 about here) 
Table 4 presents Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations for 
selected variables in our analysis. Bond yield spread (SPREAD) and bond ratings (RATING) are 
highly correlated (Pearson = 0.70; Spearman = 0.71), as bond rating is an important factor in 
determining the yield spread. Yet, this also implies other factors are taken into account by bond 
investors in addition to the rating. Also, the independence measures are correlated. For example, 
the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between UNEXPRAUD and UNEXPLTFEE is -0.32 (-0.39). 
In addition, the independence measures are correlated with RATING and SPREAD, as expected. 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Table 5 presents the results for the regressions in which bond rating and yield spread are 
the dependent variables and UNEXPRAUD is the measure of auditor independence. The left 
three columns present the results for bond ratings and the right-most three columns present the 
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results for the yield spread regressions. Starting with the bond rating analysis, the coefficients on 
UNEXPRAUD are negative both before SOX (-1.25, t = -3.03) and after SOX (-1.64, t = -3.18), 
implying that greater auditor independence is associated with better bond ratings for both 
periods examined. The difference between the two coefficients is -0.39 and is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
As for the control variables, bond ratings are more sensitive to the interest coverage ratio 
(COVR) profitability (ROA) and litigation risk (LIT) in the post-SOX period. The coefficient on 
the SOX indicator variable is positive but not significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level. 
This last result suggests no direct effect of SOX on bond ratings. 
The analysis of the yield spread, reported in the last three columns, reveals no statistically 
significant association with UNEXPRAUD in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, the coefficient on 
UNEXPRAUD in the post-SOX is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level 
(-0.26, t = -2.23). The difference between the two coefficients is -0.30 and is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. This result suggests that the negative association between the cost 
of borrowing and auditor independence has become stronger after the enactment of SOX. 
Regarding the control variables, all the controls, except ISIZE are statistically significant in 
both periods. We find that the yield spread is less sensitive to issue size (ISIZE) and more 
sensitive to issuer size (SIZE) following SOX (both at the 0.05 level). All other control variables 
do not exhibit different association with yield spread following SOX. In addition, the coefficient 
on the SOX indicator variable is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (-
0.32, t = -2.40), suggesting that, on average, yield spread decreased after the enactment of SOX. 
Note that this is in contrast to the findings of the univariate analysis reported in Table 3. This is 
broadly consistent with some of the Act’s provisions having a direct effect of reducing cost of 
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debt capital. The model explanatory power is high, as reflected by R2s ranging between 0.62 and 
0.74 across the six regressions. 
 Overall, the results so far are consistent with improvement in auditor independence 
(Table 3) and that auditor independence, as measured by UNEXPRAUD, is more inversely 
related to the cost of debt capital in the post-SOX period (Table 5). The results also suggest that 
after controlling for several economic factors, including auditor independence, the average yield 
spread has declined following SOX. The average reduction in yield spread following SOX 
should be viewed as a direct economic benefit of the Act. 
 (Table 5 about here) 
Table 6 is similar in structure to Table 5, but utilizes UNEXPLTFEE as the measure of 
auditor independence. Starting with the bond rating analysis, the coefficient on UNEXPLTFEE 
in the pre-SOX period is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. In the post-SOX 
period this coefficient is more negative and the difference between the two coefficients is 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level (-0.17, t = -2.42). This result confirms that 
the association between bond ratings and auditor independence has become stronger following 
SOX. 
Similar to Table 5, all the control variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or 
better in both periods. Also, bond ratings are more sensitive to the interest coverage ratio 
(COVR) profitability (ROA) and litigation risk (LIT) in the post-SOX period. The coefficient on 
the SOX indicator variable is, once again, positive but not significantly different from zero at the 
0.10 level.  
When SPREAD is the dependent variable, the results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 5. In particular, the independence measure is negatively related to the yield 
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spread in both periods and the difference between the two coefficients is negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level (-0.15, t = -2.20). This result suggests a stronger 
negative relationship with cost of debt capital following SOX. Also, the coefficient on the SOX 
indicator variable is negative and significantly different zero at the 0.05 level (-0.36, t = -2.57), 
suggesting that, on average, yield spread decreased after the enactment of SOX.  
Overall, the results in Tables 3, 5 and 6 are consistent with SOX improving auditor 
independence and that following the Act the negative association between auditor independence 
and cost of debt capital is stronger. This suggests that auditor independence is priced by lenders 
to a greater extent after SOX than before, consistent with auditor independence becoming more 
credible for monitoring and reporting purposes after SOX. 
(Table 6 about here) 
We carry out a number of sensitivity tests. First, because the measure of the unexpected 
component in Equation (1) may be sensitive to the model specification, we use the raw level of 
RAUD as a third measure of independence. The regression results involving this variable are 
reported in Table 7. The bond rating analysis shows that in both sub periods, the coefficient on 
RAUD is negative and significant at the 0.05 level, or better. The difference is negative, as 
expected, but not statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The analysis of yield spread shows a 
negative and significant coefficient on RAUD in both the pre-SOX and the post-SOX periods. 
The difference of -0.44 between these coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level suggesting that 
the association between the cost of borrowing and auditor independence has become stronger 
following SOX. In addition, the coefficient on the SOX indicator variable is negative (-0.28, t = -
2.26) and significant at the 0.05 level suggesting, as in tables 5 and 6, that after controlling for 
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auditor independence and other relevant factors, yield spread decreased following the enactment 
of SOX. 
(Table 7 about here) 
A potential explanation for these findings is that companies that issued debt in the post-
SOX period are fundamentally different from those that issued debt in the pre-SOX period and 
that these fundamental differences are not adequately captured by our control variables. To 
remove any fixed firm effects, we repeat the analysis using only companies that issued debt both 
in the pre- and the post-SOX periods. This way, firm-specific cross-sectional differences among 
sample firms are controlled for, although it is still possible, but less likely, that fundamental 
differences exist in the same set of firms in two different sub-periods. 
Table 8 presents summary results for the re-estimation of Tables 5-7 for companies that 
issued bonds in both sub-periods. This set contains data for 165 companies with 442 issues in 
the pre-SOX period and 748 issues in the post-SOX period. For brevity, we report only the 
coefficients on the auditor independence variables and the SOX indicator variable where panels 
A, B and C, correspond to Tables 5, 6 and 7, respectively. 
When UNEXPRAUD is the auditor independence measure, the difference in the 
coefficients between the pre- and post-SOX periods is negative, as expected, and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level for both the bond rating and the yield spread regressions. When 
UNEXPLTFEE and RAUD serve as the independence measures, the coefficient on the 
independence variable is more negative in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. The 
differences between the pre- and post-SOX coefficients are negative, as expected, in all cases. 
However, these differences are significant at the 0.05 level or better in the yield spread 
regressions but not in the bond rating regressions. Regarding the coefficients on the SOX 
23 
 
indicator variable, these are negative and significant at the 0.05 level in the yield spread 
regressions. Overall, results in Table 8 are consistent with those reported in Tables 5-7 
suggesting that firm fixed-effects are not driving our results.  
(Table 8 about here) 
We conducted several additional robustness checks. Since SPREAD, is a bounded 
dependent variable, we re-estimate the yield spread regressions in Tables 5-7 using lognormal 
transformation of the dependent variable to check the sensitivity of our findings to the normality 
assumption. Specifically, we compute the natural logarithm of one plus SPREAD and use it as 
the dependent variable in Equation (2). We find that the coefficients on UNEXPRAUD, 
UNEXPLTFEE and RAUD are more negative and statistically significant in the post-SOX period 
than in the pre-SOX period and that the difference is statistically significant at the 0.10 level or 
better in all three cases. Thus, the fact that SPREAD is a bounded dependent variable does not 
affect our inferences.  
Second, we also check the robustness of the main findings to the choice of mid 2002 as a 
cutoff point for the pre- and post-SOX periods. The implementation of the SOX Act has not been 
instantaneous as Congress left for the SEC to set the precise rules for certain sections of the Act. 
Thus, the full effect of SOX has been felt perhaps months after July 2002. On the other hand, 
consistent with our original cutoff point, it is plausible that companies have started to react to 
the new law even before the specific rules and the effective day were set for the various sections 
of the Act. We therefore replicate the analyses in Tales 5-7 by selecting 30 July 2003 as an 
alternative cutoff point. Bond issuances that took place after this date are classified as post-SOX. 
The results (not tabulated) are very similar to those reported in Tables 5-7 and all the statistical 
inferences hold as before. 
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Third, the inclusion of multiple issues by the same firm raises a concern regarding the 
over-estimation of the previous models. To address this concern, we estimate our equations 
using a reduced sample. In particular, if a firm issues multiple bonds in the same fiscal year, 
then only the first issue is used in the sample. This sampling process results in a reduced sample 
of 209 pre-SOX and 493 post-SOX firm/year observations. The results based on the reduced 
sample (not tabulated) are very similar to those reported in Tables 5-7. In particular, the 
difference in the coefficients on the independence measures UNEXPRAUD and UNEXPLTFEE 
are negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better in both the bond rating and 
yield spread regressions. However, the difference in RAUD is statistically significant only in the 
yield spread regression.5 
Our analysis identifies an inter-temporal change in the association between auditor 
independence and the cost of borrowing. It could be that other unidentified factors, unrelated to 
SOX, affect that inter-temporal relation. To address this concern we repeated our analysis using 
fiscal 2004 as an arbitrary cut-off point. Specifically, we divided the Post-SOX period into two 
periods: The period starting from the enactment of SOX and until the end of fiscal 2003 (Pre-
2004), and the period starting after fiscal 2004 and ending in fiscal 2006 (Post-2004). If what we 
capture is simply the result of a secular trend over time, we would expect to replicate the 
previous findings using this arbitrary cutoff point. However, we find that the association 
between auditor independence and cost of borrowing is not different across these two periods. 
Overall, these sensitivity tests provide additional evidence in support of the argument that the 
relationship between auditor independence and cost of borrowing has changed following the 





We investigate whether the negative association between auditor independence and the 
cost of borrowing, measured here as bond rating and yield spread, has become stronger 
following the enactment of SOX. This is an important and relevant issue as SOX and related 
regulation have been criticized for high implementation costs with little or no benefits. We offer 
a theoretical model in which cost of capital is inversely related to auditor independence. The 
model predicts that if SOX has been successful at enhancing auditor independence, and if 
reporting quality is sufficiently sensitive to auditor independence, we would expect to find 
stronger association between auditor independence and cost of debt capital in the period 
following the enactment. Our empirical findings are consistent with this prediction and are 
robust to changes in model specification, variable measurement and estimation methods. 
Nevertheless, our research design suffers from at least one caveat. It is possible that our 
findings are driven by a change in investors’ and credit rating agencies’ perceptions of the 
“value relevance” of auditor independence, rather the effect of SOX itself on auditor 
independence. That is, to the extent that bond investors and credit rating agencies did not fully 
appreciate the role of auditor independence as an effective mechanism prior to recent accounting 
scandals and the subsequent change in the regulatory landscape, they failed to take into account 
audit independence before the enactment of SOX. This may be what we capture, rather than the 
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Appendix - The Association between Auditor Independence and Cost of 
Capital - A Theoretical Model 
(1) Preliminaries 
Consider a single period competitive security market populated by risk-averse investors 
with negative exponential utility function of the form u(x) = -exp-ρx, where ρ is the risk aversion 
parameter and x is each investor’s final wealth. Without loss of generality, assume each investor 
can buy one security and that the risk-free rate is zero. If the investor buys one security, then x 
will be a function of the payoff on the security, which is assumed to be a normal random 
variable, v, where v ∼ N (μ0, σ2) and μ0 > 0. If the price of the security is P, then the investor’s 
end of period wealth is x = v – P. That is, the investor’s final wealth is the profit on the 
investment. The expected utility under these assumptions is related to the expression: 
1
2[ ( ) var( )]E v P vρ ρ− −               (A1) 
In equilibrium, P is such that the expression in the square bracket is zero. If P is too large, 
the expression in (A1) is negative, implying no one will be willing to buy the security. If P is too 
small then expression (A1) is positive, however, investors in a competitive market will bid this 
price up. Therefore the equilibrium security price is given by  
21 1
2 20( ) var( )P E v vρ μ ρσ= − = −              (A2) 
P is increasing in the expected cash flow on the security, μ0, and is decreasing in the variability 
of the final cash flow, σ2. The higher the risk of the security, the lower its price and the higher is 
the cost of capital. Therefore, a lower price is equivalent to higher cost of capital (captured here 
by the difference between P and μ0). 
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(2) The role of financial reporting 
Financial disclosure is an informative signal about the security payoff. Denote this signal S 
and let S = v + ε, where ε ∼ ),0( 2εσN . The signal is assumed unbiased and a more informative 





2 202 2 2 2 2 2( | ) var( | )P E v S v S S
ε ε
ε ε ε
σ σσρ μ ρσσ σ σ σ σ σ= − = + −+ + + .                (A3) 
Integrating over all possible realizations of S, the expected equilibrium price is given by: 
   
2
21
20 2 2( )E P
ε
ε
σμ ρσ σ σ= − +                (A4) 
P, on average, is negatively related to the signal’s variance, 2εσ , which means that less 
accurate financial reporting increases the investment risk. 
 
(3) The link between auditor independence and the accuracy of financial reporting 
The production of accurate financial statements is assumed to be a function of auditor 
independence: lower auditor independence reduces the accuracy of the reports. Lower reporting 
accuracy is costly, as this could lead to loss of reputation, higher likelihood of SEC 
investigation, and litigation. 
Let h denote the variance of the report S, where h ≡ 2εσ . Assume h(I) is any function 
such that ( ) 0h I′ <  and ( ) 0h I′′ ≥ . That is, higher independence results in lower h, or higher 




(4) The link between auditor independence and monitoring 
Higher auditor independence is expected to improve the processes of monitoring and fraud 
detection. To capture this, assume any function 0( ) ( )I f Iμ μ= −  such that, min( ) 0f I > ,  
max( ) 0f I =  and ( ) 0f I′ < implying ( ) 0Iμ′ > . When auditor independence is at its highest 
possible level, fraud or expropriation by managers is zero and the security's expected cash flow 
is equal its original value μ0. But if the auditor reduces her independence, there will be a 
reduction in the effectiveness of monitoring, leading to a higher level of fraud, and hence, 
reduction in expected cash flows. 
  
(5) The effect of auditor independence on the cost of capital 
The cost of capital is lower when the auditor is more independent. To see that, rewrite 
Equation (A4) – the expected equilibrium price - as follows: 
21
2 2
( )( ) ( )
( )
h IE P I
h I
μ ρσ σ= − +                    (A5) 
To see how E(P) changes with I, differentiate Equation (A5) with respect to I. Because the slope 
coefficient in the regression of the security price on auditor independence, β, is this derivative: 
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2 2 2
( ) ( )( ) 0
( ( ))
dE P h II
dI h I
β μ ρσ σ
′′≡ = − >+                   (A6) 
The positive relation is the consequence of two effects of the auditor independence: (i) the effect 
of improving the accuracy of the accounting report and thereby reducing the investment risk, 
as 0)( <′ Ih , and (ii) the effect of preventing fraud and waste through monitoring as 0)( >′ Iμ . 
The former effect on the cost of capital is present when investors are risk-averse. On the other 
hand, the latter effect influences the price independently of the market's degree of risk aversion.   
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Since E(P) increases in I, it follows that the expected cost of capital is decreasing in 




2 ( ) ( )( ( ))( )
( ( ))
d h I h I h II
dI h I
β σμ ρσ σ
′ ′′− +′′= + +                  (A7) 
The magnitude of the negative association between cost of capital and auditor independence is 
stronger (weaker) if Equation (A7) is positive (negative). Specifically, if the variance of the 
signal is sufficiently sensitive to auditor independence (i.e., when 2( )h I′  is sufficiently large), 
Equation (A7) will be positive.6 Alternatively, a sufficient condition for a positive sign is that 
both ( ) 0Iμ′′ = and ( ) 0h I′′ = .  
 
(6) The auditor’s optimal independence choice 
An external auditor considers how much I units of independence she should maintain in 
her engagement with a client, where I is selected from the real range [Imin, Imax]. The profit 
function for the external auditor, which is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, is. 
( ) [ ( )]Kg I C h I λπ = − , 1λ >                      (A8) 
Here Kg(I) represents the revenue function whereby ( ) 0g I′ <  - so higher independence causes a 
reduction in revenues - and K is the dollar revenue lost when independence is increased by one 
unit. Further assume that ( ) 0g I′′ < , implying that the loss to revenues is relatively small as I 
increases in the vicinity of Imin – i.e., when the auditor is highly dependent on the client - and 
much larger in the vicinity f Imax – i.e., when the auditor is highly independent. C represents a 
cost associated with weaker independence, and this cost is increasing faster with h, as is 
reflected in the condition that 1λ > .7 
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The auditor’s objective is to maximize expression (A8) by optimally choosing I. Thus, we 
need to solve the following expression: 
max ( ) ( )I Kg I Ch I
λπ = −                              (A9) 
The first and second order conditions are given by A10 and A11, respectively: 
1( ) ( ) ( ) 0Kg I C h I h Iλλ −′ ′− =                 (A10) 
2 2( ) ( ) [( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )] 0Kg I C h I h I h I h Iλλ λ−′′ ′ ′′− − + <                (A11) 
The sign of (A11) is negative, confirming it is a maximization problem with a unique solution.8 
Two important observations arise: First, a higher K will lead to lower auditor independence, 
because the auditor will optimally select a smaller I while earning higher fees. Second, a higher 
C leads to higher auditor independence.9 
 
(7) The effect of SOX on auditor independence and cost of capital 
 
The objective of SOX was to cause auditors to become more diligent in the monitoring and 
reporting activities by imposing restrictions on NAS and the creation of the PCAOB, among 
other requirements. These requirements are essentially equivalent to increasing C, the cost 
associated with weaker independence. On the other hand, the rent K charged by auditors for 
giving up a unit of independence could increase following SOX. This is plausible because 
auditors now face a tougher litigation environment, so they may demand a higher rent following 
SOX. 
To find out the effect of SOX on I and, in turn, on β, consider a continuous variable L that 
represent the strictness of the legal environment. To the extent that SOX makes the legal 
environment stricter, it will work to increase L. Let  /K L∂ ∂  represent the effect of changing the 
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legal environment on the auditor’s revenues and let /C L∂ ∂  denote the effect on cost. Therefore 
the effect on the equilibrium level of independence is given by 
dI I K I C
dL K L C L
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ .        (A12) 
Note that the sign of (A12) is ambiguous because ∂I/∂K < 0 and ∂I/∂C > 0. We believe that the 
sign of (A12) on empirical grounds is likely positive. This is quite plausible, as the main focus 
of SOX was to create a framework that penalizes lack of independence. Furthermore, Table 3 
indicates that total fees have declined after SOX, which in turn suggests auditors may not have 
been able to charge more for collusion with managers while keeping the same level of 
independence. Had SOX reduced auditor independence we would expect total fees to increase 
after its enactment. 
Now, the effect of SOX on β can be expressed as 
d dI
dL I dL
β β∂= ∂ .                                           (A13) 
Our main findings are consistent with a positive sign of (A13) as we find stronger negative 
association between auditor independence and cost of capital in the post-SOX period. 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Estimating an Expectation Model for RAUD 
(Quasi-Likelihood Method)* 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ROA 0.16 0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.10 -0.02 -0.92 
 (0.93) (0.74) (0.48) (-0.37) (-0.40) (-0.16) (-3.59)***
LOSS 0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.02 
 (1.85)* (-0.19) (0.70) (1.91)* (2.02)** (2.28)** (0.26) 
MRET -0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 
 (-0.07) (0.34) (1.09) (1.93)* (-2.53)** (1.94)* (-0.26) 
CFO -0.08 -0.39 -0.33 -0.33 -0.06 -0.36 -0.77 
 (-0.34) (-2.46)** (-1.89)* (-1.65)* (-0.26) (-2.02)** (-2.79)***
LEV 0.22 0.06 -0.10 0.04 -0.16 0.00 -0.14 
 (1.79)* (0.53) (-0.89) (0.34) (-1.36) (0.03) (-1.09) 
INVREC 0.23 0.08 0.11 0.20 -0.11 0.01 0.32 
 (1.70)* (0.68) (0.99) (1.74)* (-0.83) (0.11) (2.15)** 
SIZE -0.27 -0.24 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
 (-20.04)*** (-19.10)*** (-11.19)*** (-9.57)*** (-3.54)*** (-5.64)*** (-2.46)**
MB -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (-0.12) (-1.77)* (-1.95)* (-1.92)* (-2.61)** (-0.29) (-2.34)**
SALEG -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 
 (-0.51) (-0.77) (-2.16)** (0.20) (0.46) (0.40) (0.23) 
MA -0.15 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.06 -0.13 -0.27 
 (-0.80) (-2.05)** (-0.83) (-2.43)** (-0.64) (-1.97)** (-3.64)***
SEG 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01  0.04 
 (2.77)*** (0.45) (2.20)** (-0.15) (0.82) (2.07)** (2.58)** 
AUDDUM -0.19 -0.42 -0.23 -0.06 0.09 0.27 0.37 
 (-2.12)** (-5.49)*** (-3.38)*** (-0.98) (2.37)** (5.65)*** (5.29)***
TENU 0.19 0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 
 (3.30)*** (1.80)* (-1.71)* (-1.83)* (-0.24) (0.77) (-0.67) 
SWITCH -0.47 0.34 0.07 -0.03 -0.07 0.11 -0.01 
 (-3.75)*** (3.03)*** (0.91) (-0.30) (-0.70) (2.22)** (-0.09) 
LIT 0.07 0.05 -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 
 (3.53)*** (2.87)*** (-0.10) (1.82)* (2.01)** (2.98)*** (0.62) 
Observations 1,981 2,821 3,509 3,539 3,697 3,108 3,118 
Log Likelihood -1,208 -1,658 -1,913 -1,984 -1,751 -1,234 -1,337 
Prob>Chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 1 (Continue) 
Panel B: Estimating an Expectation Model for LTFEE 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
ROA -0.89 -0.42 -0.76 -0.92 -0.57 -0.53 -0.76 
 (-6.00)*** (-4.61)*** (-6.92)*** (-6.92)*** (-4.10)*** (-5.65)*** (-6.45)***
LOSS -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.05 
 (-1.50) (1.59) (1.47) (2.26)** (2.06)** (3.78)*** (1.33) 
MRET -0.12 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 
 (-3.92)*** (0.58) (0.45) (1.58) (-3.32)*** (-3.22)*** (0.57) 
CFO 0.23 -0.16 0.36 0.41 -0.01 -0.11 0.31 
 (1.26) (-1.27) (2.47)** (2.71)*** (-0.08) (-1.09) (2.29)** 
LEV -0.24 -0.10 0.08 0.02 0.24 0.04 -0.00 
 (-2.35)** (-1.21) (0.90) (0.25) (2.84)*** (0.80) (-0.01) 
INVREC 0.63 0.67 0.77 0.63 0.61 0.52 0.48 
 (5.80)*** (7.54)*** (8.07)*** (7.35)*** (7.01)*** (9.17)*** (5.76)***
SIZE 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.58 
 (56.82)*** (65.17)*** (60.31)*** (66.39)*** (61.57)*** (88.58)*** (60.83)***
MB 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (4.21)*** (2.13)** (1.93)* (5.23)*** (3.65)*** (3.27)*** (3.27)***
SALEG -0.12 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.12 -0.09 -0.27 
 (-2.01)** (-1.81)* (-0.51) (0.04) (-2.73)*** (-2.06)** (-0.90) 
MA 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.06 
 (1.45) (3.50)*** (3.47)*** (2.42)** (2.48)** (4.19)*** (1.14) 
SEG 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (4.47)*** (6.13)*** (5.34)*** (8.15)*** (6.26)*** (8.70)*** (5.44)***
AUDDUM 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.51 0.37 0.43 
 (1.36) (3.52)*** (4.63)*** (5.53)*** (12.03)*** (13.76)*** (11.38)***
TENU -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.16 
 (-0.75) (-0.44) (2.14)** (3.63)*** (3.12)*** (3.43)*** (3.74)***
SWITCH -0.07 -0.43 -0.56 -0.24 -0.14 -0.21 -0.23 
 (-0.77) (-6.11)*** (-9.08)*** (-4.13)*** (-2.42)** (-6.55)*** (-5.33)***
LIT 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (1.00) (0.50) (2.27)** (2.81)*** (2.23)** (3.76)*** (2.19)** 
Observations 1,981 2,821 3,509 3,539 3,697 3,108 3,118 
Adj-R2 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.74 
 
Notes:  
1. The Table presents annual results for estimating equations (1) with RAUD as the dependent 
variable in Panel A (using the Quasi-Likelihood method), and with LTFEE as the dependent 
variable in Panel B (using OLS). Regressions include industry fixed effects (not tabulated). 
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2. Dependent variables are defined as follows: RAUD is measured as audit fees paid by client i 
to audit firm j divided by total fees paid by client i to audit firm j. UNEXPRAUD denotes 
unexpected values of RAUD based on regression residuals obtained from annual regression 
models as described in Panel A. LTFEE is the natural logarithm of total fees (audit and non-
audit) received by the external auditor j from client i. UNEXPLTFEE denotes unexpected 
values of [(-1) x LTFEE], based on regression residuals obtained from annual regression 
models as described in Panel B. 
3. Independent variables are defined as follows: ROA denotes return on assets, measured as net 
income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18) divided by total assets (item #6). 
LOSS is an indicator variable that obtains the value of “1” if the firm reports negative net 
income (item #18), and “0”otherwise. MRET is market-adjusted annual stock return, 
measured as the difference between raw return for a specific firm minus the return on a 
value-weighted market portfolio obtained from CRSP. CFO denotes cash flows from 
operations (item #308) divided by total assets (item #6). LEV denotes leverage, measured as 
the ratio of long term debt (data #9) over total assets (data #6). INVREC denotes inventory 
(item #3) plus accounts receivable (item #2) divided by total assets (item #6). SIZE is 
measured as log (1 + total assets) = log (1+ Compustat data #6). MB denotes market-to-book 
ratio, measured as market value of equity (item #25 multiplied by item #199) divided by 
book value of equity (item #216). SALEG denotes sales growth, measured as average 
percentage change in sales over the last three years. MA is an indicator variable, taking the 
value of “1” if there is merger and acquisition activity in the current year, and “0” otherwise. 
SEG is the number of business segments. AUDDUM is an indicator variable, equal to “1” if 
the auditor belongs to Big-4, and “0” otherwise. TENU is the natural logarithm of 
(1+TENURE), where TENURE is the length of the auditor-client relationship, measured as 
the number of years the firm has been consistently audited by the current auditor, as of the 
bond filing date and based on Compustat. SWITCH is an indicator variable, equal to “1” if a 
bond-issuing firm switches to a different audit firm in the fiscal year prior to the bond 
issuance, and “0” otherwise. LIT is litigation risk, measured as the standard deviation of 
monthly return for the past 36 months. 
4. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report the 
coefficient estimate and two-tailed t-stats (below each coefficient).  
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Table 2 
Sample Selection – Bond Issuances* 
 
Panel A: Sampling Criterion Observations
Bonds that are rated by either Moody's or S&P’s, excluding utilities 
and financial institutions and bonds with maturities of less than one 
year 
3,214 
Missing bond yield premium  (870) 
 2,344 
Loss of observations on merging SDC bond data with Compustat and 
Audit Analytics data 
 (374) 
 1,970 
Missing financial data  (168) 
Final sample 1,802 
 
Panel B: Sample Selection by Industry 
  Observations Firms 
FF1  Consumer Non Durables 145 39 
FF2 Consumer Durables 291 19 
FF3 Manufacturing 430 58 
FF4 Oil, Gas and Coal Extraction and Products 69 34 
FF5 Chemicals and Allied Products 147 30 
FF6 Business Equipment 88 29 
FF7 Telephone and Television Transmission 90 26 
FF8 Utilities - - 
FF9 Wholesale, Retail and Some Services 132 38 
FF10 Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 63 28 
FF11 Finance - - 
FF12 Other 347 61 
Total   1,802 362 
 
*Note: Panel A presents details of the total sample selection. Panel B presents the number of 
observations and firms by industry according to Fama & French’s 12-industry classification 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french). Utilities and Financial Institutions are 
excluded from the sample. 
 39
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics – Bond Issuances Sample* 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Pre-Sox Post-SOX t-test Wilcoxon 
 Mean Median STD Mean Median STD (p-value) (p-value) 
SPREAD 1.55  1.20  1.11 1.80 1.60 1.13 -4.6 (0.00) -6.4 (0.00)
RATING 6.86  7.00  3.29 8.03 8.00 3.04 -7.4 (0.00) -6.6 (0.00)
ISIZE 0.07  0.05  0.09 0.04 0.03 0.08 6.9 (0.00) 3.6 (0.00)
OSCORE -1.50  -1.43  2.91 -1.33 -1.38 2.39 -1.3 (0.21) -1.3 (0.18)
COVR 6.72  4.58  10.01 6.95 4.03 9.28 -0.5 (0.63) 1.0 (0.36)
RAUD 0.39  0.45  0.33 0.68 0.73 0.26 -19.3 (0.00) -11.9 (0.00)
UNEXPRAUD 0.18  0.17  0.25 0.10 0.07 0.21 7.3 (0.00) 6.1 (0.00)
LTFEE 16.48  16.49  1.63 16.10 15.90 1.35 5.0 (0.00) 6.5 (0.00)
UNEXPLTFEE -0.04  -0.09  1.16 -0.19 -0.17 0.86 2.9 (0.00) 3.6 (0.00)
SIZE 10.12  10.18  1.19 9.81 9.97 1.26 5.0 (0.00) 5.0 (0.00)
LEV 0.39  0.38  0.17 0.32 0.28 0.16 7.8 (0.00) 7.2 (0.00)
SALEG 0.13  0.09  0.28 0.12 0.10 0.16 1.2 (0.23) -1.4 (0.17)
ROA 0.10  0.10  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 7.0 (0.00) 6.7 (0.00)
LOSS 0.12  0.00  0.33 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.9 (0.36) 0.9 (0.36)
MRET 0.14  0.11  0.34 0.05 0.01 0.27 5.2 (0.00) 6.0 (0.00)
CFO 0.11  0.12  0.06 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.6 (0.54) 1.1 (0.28)
INVREC 0.21  0.19  0.14 0.23 0.22 0.18 -1.3 (0.21) -1.1 (0.29)
MB 5.15  3.52  5.77 3.56 2.69 3.55 5.9 (0.00) 3.9 (0.00)
AUDDUM 1.00  1.00  0.05 0.99 1.00 0.10 1.1 (0.29) 1.1 (0.29)
SWITCH 0.09  0.00  0.29 0.03 0.00 0.18 4.4 (0.00) 4.4 (0.00)
TENU 2.42  2.64  0.62 1.96 2.30 0.88 9.8 (0.00) 1.3 (0.21)
MA 0.11  0.00  0.32 0.15 0.00 0.36 -1.8 (0.07) -1.8 (0.07)
SEG 3.07  1.00  2.48 3.37 3.00 2.29 -2.2 (0.03) -3.0 (0.00)
LIT 0.82  0.80  1.72 0.68 0.65 1.40 1.8 (0.08) 3.1 (0.00)
 
Panel B: Means and medians of RAUD and LTFEE by year 
 




2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Mean 0.33 0.33 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.55 
Median 0.29 0.25 0.57 0.64 0.61 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.64 
LTFEE          
Mean 16.51 16.29 16.74 16.59 15.98 16.15 15.91 15.69 16.26 
Median 16.94 15.92 16.88 16.84 15.79 15.99 15.97 15.71 16.05 
Observations 167 362 248 221 251 234 130 189 1,802 
 
Note: The Table presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. RATING 
denotes Moody’s bond rating on a cardinal scale from 1 for Aaa to 22 for D; SPREAD is the 
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difference in percentage points between the yield-to-maturity for the corporate bond and that of 
a U.S. treasury bond with comparable maturity; ISIZE is the size of the debt issue, measured as 
the ratio of total principal amount of the bond over firm’s total assets; OSCORE is a measure of 
default risk based on the coefficients obtained by Ohlson (1980); COVR is the interest coverage 
ratio, measured as operating income after depreciation (Compustat data #178) divided by 






  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 SPREAD  0.70 0.35 0.32 -0.17 0.14 -0.11 0.37 -0.02 0.33 -0.29 -0.25 0.22 
2 RATING 0.71  0.33 0.28 -0.11 0.12 -0.19 0.36 -0.11 0.18 -0.42 -0.36 0.09 
3 ISIZE 0.44 0.43  0.85 0.72 0.62 0.38 0.81 0.68 0.16 -0.05 -0.15 0.79 
4 OSCORE 0.46 0.39 0.67  0.74 0.55 0.50 0.81 0.66 0.17 -0.38 -0.07 0.77 
5 UNEXPRAUD -0.20 -0.12 0.53 0.59  -0.32 0.49 0.69 0.66 0.02 0.06 0.24 0.67 
6 UNEXPLTFEE 0.17 0.09 0.59 0.51 -0.39  0.50 0.47 0.44 -0.12 -0.03 -0.25 0.57 
7 SIZE -0.08 -0.12 0.26 0.33 0.51 0.58  0.37 0.44 -0.19 -0.04 -0.02 0.54 
8 LEV 0.41 0.37 0.68 0.83 0.61 0.52 0.39  0.58 0.15 -0.13 0.12 0.68 
9 ROA -0.05 -0.14 0.51 0.41 0.60 0.56 0.48 0.48  0.10 0.65 0.58 0.71 
10 MRET 0.21 0.13 -0.02 0.11 0.12 -0.16 -0.14 0.13 0.09  0.07 0.03 0.12 
11 CFO -0.41 -0.47 -0.14 -0.37 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.19 0.72 0.08  0.48 0.10 
12 MB -0.47 -0.57 -0.28 -0.14 0.06 0.01 0.11 -0.12 0.63 0.08 0.56  0.02 
13 LIT 0.28 0.23 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.41 0.55 0.59 0.18 0.04 -0.04  
 
Note: The Table presents pair-wise correlations for selected variables. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) 
the diagonal. Correlations above 0.06 and below -0.06 are significant at the 0.05 level. The variables are: SPREAD is the difference 
in percentage points between the yield-to-maturity for the corporate bond and that of a U.S. treasury bond with comparable maturity; 
RATING is Moody’s bond rating on a cardinal scale from 1 for Aaa to 22 for D; ISIZE is the size of the debt issue, measured as the 
ratio of total principal amount of the bond over firm’s total assets; OSCORE is a measure of default risk based on the coefficients 
obtained by Ohlson (1980); UNEXPRAUD is unexpected values of the ratio of audit fees to total fees;  UNEXPLTFEE denotes 
unexpected values of log of total fees; SIZE is measured as log (1+ Compustat data #6). LEV denotes leverage, measured as the ratio 
of long term debt (data #9) over total assets (data #6). ROA denotes return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary 
items (Compustat item #18) divided by total assets (item #6). MRET is market-adjusted annual stock return, measured as the 
difference between raw return for a specific firm minus the return on a value-weighted market portfolio obtained from CRSP. CFO 
denotes cash flows from operations (item #308) divided by total assets (item #6). MB denotes market-to-book ratio, measured as 
market value of equity (item #25 multiplied by item #199) divided by book value of equity (item #216). LIT is litigation risk, 
measured as the standard deviation of monthly return for the past 36 months. 
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Table 5 
The Association between Auditor Independence (UNEXPRAUD) and 
Bond Rating (RATING) and Yield Spread (SPREAD)* 
 
 Bond Rating (RATING) Yield Spread (SPREAD) 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference 
UNEXPRAUD -1.25 -1.64 -0.39 0.04 -0.26 -0.30 
 (-3.03)*** (-3.18)*** (-2.16)** (1.32) (-2.23)** (-2.01)** 
RATING    0.19 0.21 0.02 
    (12.60)*** (14.35)*** (0.23) 
ISIZE 15.54 13.50 -2.04 3.25 1.20 -2.05 
 (4.89)*** (4.75)*** (-0.68) (3.13)*** (1.10) (-2.31)** 
SIZE -0.75 -0.73 0.02 -0.21 -0.09 0.12 
 (-6.01)*** (-8.11)*** (0.13) (-5.13)*** (-2.39)** (2.16)** 
LEV 3.42 3.33 -0.09 0.54 1.07 0.53 
 (3.31)*** (4.00)*** (-0.51) (1.61) (3.33)*** (1.47) 
OSCORE 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02 
 (2.53)** (5.15)*** (1.05) (3.29)*** (2.68)*** (-1.52) 
COVR -0.19 -0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 
 (-7.89)*** (-5.54)*** (2.39)** (-2.17)** (-2.89)*** (-0.39) 
ROA -5.74 -8.64 -2.90 -2.94 -3.19 -0.25 
 (-2.18)** (-5.85)*** (-2.48)** (-3.49)*** (-4.62)*** (-1.03) 
LIT 0.60 0.80 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.01 
 (6.57)*** (6.82)*** (1.99)* (3.74)*** (2.51)** (0.83) 
SOX   0.86   -0.32 
   (0.53)   (-2.40)** 
No. of Obs. 518 1,284 1,802 518 1,284 1,802 




1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry 
fixed effects (not tabulated). See Tables 1 and 3 for variable definitions. 
 






















4321   (2b) 
 
3. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report 
coefficient estimates and t-statistics (below each coefficient).
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Table 6 
The Association between Auditor Independence (UNEXPLTFEE) and Bond 
Rating (RATING) and Yield Spread (SPREAD)* 
 
 Bond Rating (RATING) Yield Spread (SPREAD) 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference
UNEXPLTFEE -0.15 -0.32 -0.17 -0.04 -0.19 -0.15 
 (-1.95)* (-3.09)*** (-2.42)** (-1.49) (-2.48)** (-2.20)** 
RATING    0.19 0.20 0.01 
    (12.51)*** (14.26)*** (0.32) 
ISIZE 15.90 13.31 -2.59 2.92 1.14 -1.78 
 (5.05)*** (4.68)*** (-0.87) (2.83)*** (1.04) (-2.34)** 
SIZE -0.76 -0.74 0.02 -0.23 -0.09 0.14 
 (-5.98)*** (-8.18)*** (0.11) (-5.40)*** (-2.40)** (2.38)** 
LEV 3.42 3.41 -0.01 0.67 1.05 0.38 
 (3.27)*** (4.09)*** (-0.44) (1.99)** (3.28)*** (1.19) 
OSCORE 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02 
 (2.52)** (5.18)*** (1.10) (3.52)*** (2.76)*** (-1.56) 
COVR -0.18 -0.10 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 
 (-7.82)*** (-5.40)*** (2.68)*** (-2.28)** (-2.87)*** (-0.44) 
ROA -5.80 -8.73 -2.93 -2.77 -3.28 -0.51 
 (-2.20)** (-5.88)*** (-2.51)** (-3.28)*** (-4.70)*** (-1.15) 
LIT 0.58 0.83 0.25 0.10 0.11 0.01 
 (6.51)*** (7.04)*** (2.10)** (3.48)*** (2.45)** (0.64) 
SOX   0.85   -0.36 
   (0.52)   (-2.57)** 
No. of Obs. 518 1,284 1,802 518 1,284 1,802 




1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry 
fixed effects (not tabulated). See Tables 1 and 3 for variable definitions.  
 






















4321   (2b) 
 
3. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report 
coefficient estimates and t-statistics (below each coefficient).
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Table 7 
The Association between Auditor Independence (RAUD) and Bond Rating 
(RATING) and Yield Spread (SPREAD)* 
 
 Bond Rating (RATING) Yield Spread (SPREAD) 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference
RAUD -1.20 -1.48 -0.28 -0.07 -0.51 -0.44 
 (-2.43)** (-3.59)*** (-0.84) (-2.47)** (-3.21)*** (-2.83)*** 
RATING    0.19 0.21 0.02 
    (12.52)*** (14.70)*** (0.70) 
ISIZE 15.89 10.99 -4.90 2.98 1.41 -1.57 
 (5.01)*** (3.80)*** (-1.34) (2.87)*** (0.36) (-1.84) * 
SIZE -0.76 -0.75 0.01 -0.22 -0.08 0.14 
 (-5.90)*** (-8.35)*** (0.17) (-5.18)*** (-2.12)** (2.57)** 
LEV 3.37 3.63 0.26 0.60 0.81 0.21 
 (3.24)*** (4.77)*** (0.12) (1.80)* (2.47)** (0.82) 
OSCORE 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.02 
 (2.50)** (4.92)*** (0.91) (3.42)*** (2.83)*** (-1.53) 
COVR -0.18 -0.10 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 
 (-7.74)*** (-5.01)*** (2.82)*** (-2.22)** (-2.50)** (-0.63) 
ROA -5.97 -8.34 -2.37 -2.88 -3.08 -0.20 
 (-2.27)** (-6.18)*** (-2.73)*** (-3.42)*** (-4.28)*** (-0.97) 
LIT 0.59 0.84 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.00 
 (6.32)*** (7.22)*** (2.02)** (3.25)*** (2.13)** (0.75) 
SOX   -0.26   -0.28 
   (-0.16)   (-2.26)** 
No. of Obs. 518 1,284 1,802 518 1,284 1,802 




1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry 
fixed effects (not tabulated). See Tables 1 and 3 for variable definitions.  
 






















54321   (2b) 
 
3. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report 
coefficient estimates and t-statistics (below each coefficient).
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Table 8 
Sensitivity Analysis using a Reduced Sample of Companies that Issued Debt 
Before and After SOX* 
 
 Bond Rating (RATING) Yield Spread (SPREAD) 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Diff. Pre-SOX Post-SOX Diff. 
Indep. = UNEXPRAUD       
UNEXPRAUD -1.34 -1.80 -0.46 0.10 -0.16 -0.26 
 (-3.14)*** (-3.04)*** (-2.68)*** (1.08) (-2.52)** (-3.15)*** 
SOX   0.43   -0.27 
   (0.18)   (-2.01)** 
Observations 442 748 1,190 442 748 1,190 
Adj-R2 0.68 0.60 0.64 0.65 0.55 0.57 
Indep. = UNEXPLTFEE       
UNEXPLTFEE -0.20 -0.28 -0.08 -0.07 -0.23 -0.16 
 (-2.35)** (-2.89)*** (-1.42) (-1.09) (-2.53)** (-2.08)** 
SOX   0.40   -0.25 
   (0.21)   (-2.07)** 
Observations 442 748 1,190 442 748 1,190 
Adj-R2 0.68 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.55 0.56 
Indep. = RAUD       
RAUD -1.30 -1.37 -0.07 -0.05 -0.61 -0.56 
 (-2.83)*** (-3.59)*** (-0.75) (-1.87)* (-3.39)*** (-2.94)*** 
SOX   -0.18   -0.23 
   (-0.68)   (-2.02)** 
Observations 442 748 1,190 442 748 1,190 




1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry 
fixed effects. We report only the coefficients on the independence measures (UNEXPRAUD, 
UNEXPLTFEE, and RAUD). 
 
2. See Table 6 for a description of the estimated models and Tables 1 and 3 for variable 
definitions. 
 
3. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report a 





                                                 
1 See SEC Final Rule Release No. 33-8183 (http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm). 
2 See http://www.pcaobus.org/About_the_PCAOB/index.aspx. 
3 SEC argues that these “rules advance our important policy goal of protecting the millions of 
people who invest in our securities markets in reliance on financial statements that are prepared 
by public companies and other issuers and that, as required by Congress, are audited by 
independent auditors (“Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor 
Independence” Final Release No. 33-8183, 2003). 
4  All continuous explanatory variables, except the auditor independence variables, are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate the effect of extreme observations. 
5 We check whether the results are influenced by heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) 
approach. The results are very similar to those reported in Tables 5-7. 
6 The specific condition is 2 2 2 24
1 ( )( ) ( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]
2
u Ih I h I h I h Iσ σρσ
′′⎡ ⎤′ ′′> − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
7 The assumption behind this condition is that the chance of legal action or loss of reputation is 
increasing faster the higher the inaccuracy of the financial report S. In the extreme case where 
the auditor allows the report to be meaningless, the penalty is infinitely high (as in the case of 
Arthur Andersen). This assumption can be relaxed to allow the cost function to be concave (i.e., 
0 1λ< < ). In addition, ( )h I′′ can be assumed to be negative and ( )g I′′ to be positive. However, 
with these alternative assumptions, to ensure an interior solution the sign of the second order 
condition (A8) should be assumed negative. 
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8  In a more general setting ( )h I′′ can be assumed to be negative and ( )g I′′ to be positive. 
However, with these alternative assumptions, to ensure an interior solution the sign of the 
second order condition (A11) should be assumed negative. 
9 These observations follow from the application of the Implicit Function Theorem to Equation 
(A10) noting that the sign of Equation (A11) is negative. 
